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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ANDREW E. HOOPER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20061068-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from second- and third-
degree felony convictions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a~3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I: Where the defendant causes a two-car traffic accident behind which 
traffic builds up, and another driver's unforeseen and criminally negligent inattention 
causes his semi-truck to plow into the rear of the stopped traffic, did the sentencing court 
violate the defendant's due process right to be sentenced only upon relevant information 
when it determined the defendant's prison sentence based in large part upon the harm 
caused by the semi-truck crash? 
Standard of Review: Whether due process requirements were satisfied at 
sentencing presents a question of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness 
with no deference paid the trial court's conclusion. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 
If 9, 31 P.3d 615 (quoting State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573); State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1073 (Utah 1993) (reviewing from a correctness perspective the 
issue of whether information relied on at sentencing was unreliable and considered at 
sentencing in violation of due process). "Subsidiary factual determinations" are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, % 11, 95 P.3d 
302 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n.3 (Utah 1991)). A due process 
violation at sentencing requires reversal unless the violation is harmless. See Wanosik, 
2001 UT App 241, at ^36. 
Preservation: The defendant moved at the sentencing hearing to strike from the 
Presentence Report (PSR) (located in the record on appeal in the envelope marked R. 71) 
all mention of the accident caused by the truck driver, along with any statements from 
persons affected by the crash he caused. R. 84:3-5. The defendant objected to allowing a 
person affected by the semi-truck crash to speak at the defendant's sentencing hearing. 
R. 84:13. The sentence-hearing transcript, R. 84, is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
POINT II; Where a sentencing court erroneously determines that the harm 
caused by another actor's unforeseen and criminal behavior is relevant to the defendant's 
sentence, and erroneously determines that the presentence investigation report (PSR) 
accurately attributes the harm caused by said unforeseen and criminal behavior to the 
defendant, did the trial court violate section 77-18-l(6)(a) by refusing to remove from the 
PSR any reference to this irrelevant and inaccurate information? 
Standard of Review: "' Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal 
duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports 
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is a question of law that we review for correctness.'" State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App, f^ 
23, 94 P.3d 295 (quoting State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, \ 13, 6 P.3d 1133). 
Preservation: The defendant argued that it was not correct to say he caused the 
semi-truck crash, nor that the harm caused by that crash was relevant to determining his 
sentence. R. 84:3,4. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005), § 41-6a-503 (2005), § 76-3-401 (2003) § 76-
5-207 (Supp. 2006), and § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2006) are attached as Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant initially was charged by information with two counts of automobile 
homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006), two counts of driving 
under the influence and causing serious bodily injury in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6a-502 (2005), one count of keeping an open container in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6a-526 (2005), and one count of driving the wrong way on a one-way road in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-709 (2005). R. 1-3. He subsequently was charged 
by amended information with one count of automobile homicide, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006), and one count of driving under 
the influence and causing serious bodily injury, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005). R. 51-52. 
The defendant pleaded guilty to the two counts alleged in the amended 
information. R. 47. 
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On October 20, 2006, the defendant was sentenced to prison for a term of from 
one to fifteen years on the second degree felony, and from zero to five years on the third 
degree felony. R. 68. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. R. 69. The 
Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 68-70, are attached hereto as Addendum 
A. 
On November 15, 2006, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 72-73. 
Pursuant to two motions for thirty-day extensions granted by this court, the defendant's 
opening brief is due April 2, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Defendant's Accident. 
Sometime before 5 p.m., on June 18, 2005, the defendant entered 1-80 at the 7200 
West interchange driving west in the eastbound lanes. PSR at 2-3. Upon realizing his 
mistake, the defendant continued driving west at 30 mph in what would be the left lane 
for eastbound drivers. Id. at 3. 
An eastbound Saturn automobile was driving erratically. Id. at 4. (twice slowing 
to where it was overtaken by a car traveling 75 mph, only to accelerate ahead of the car at 
a "rapid pace"). The Saturn was in the left lane. Id. Ahead of the Saturn, a bus changed 
from the right lane to the left lane. Id. This forced the Saturn to brake. Id. The bus 
changed back to the right lane and thus avoided the westbound defendant. Id. The 
Saturn continued in the left lane, and collided head-on with the defendant. Id. 
The driver of the Saturn and the front-seat passenger were both hospitalized in 
critical condition. M a t 3. Each died in the days that followed. Id. One backseat 
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passenger was seriously injured. Id. The other backseat passenger suffered minor 
injuries. Id. Blood drawn some four hours after the collision measured the Saturn 
driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) at 0.17 gm./lOO ml. blood. Id. 
The defendant was hospitalized in fair condition. His BAC was measured at .15 
gm. less than four hours after the collision. Id. There existed evidence that the 
defendant's mistake may have been related, in part, to a prior-existing seizure condition. 
SeeR. 84:5-6,7-8. 
B. The Semi-Truck Crash. 
It was clear and sunny the afternoon of June 18th.1 The defendant's accident 
occurred before 5 p.m. See PSR at 2 (state troopers arrived at the scene at 5:03 p.m.). By 
5:30 p.m., traffic on eastbound 1-80 was backed up for approximately 1.45 miles behind 
the defendant's accident. Id. at 4. 
At approximately 5:30 p.m., a semi-truck crashed into the backed up traffic. Id. 
In the ensuing mayhem caused by the semi-truck's failure to slow or stop, three persons 
died, and nine more were injured. Id. 
1
 Weather Underground, History for Salt Lake City, Utah, Saturday, June 18, 2005 
(attached as Addendum D; visibility was ten miles or more all day long); U.S. Naval 
Observatory, Salt Lake City, Utah, Rise and Set for the Sun for 2005 (attached as 
Addendum E; adding one hour for daylight time, the sun set at 9:21 p.m. on June 18, 
2005). This court may take judicial notice of these geographical facts pursuant to Utah 
R. Ev. 201(b), (d) (2006). See, e.g., Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116, 
125 (Utah 1930) (Bramel, Dist. J., sitting by designation, concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) ("[The Utah Supreme Court] takes judicial notice of the general geography of this 
state, of its history, and of the general facts of its agricultural condition and development 
and of how classes of men earn their bread. In short, a court is presumed to know what 
every man of ordinary intelligence must know about such things.") 
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The truck driver had exceeded federal driving-time restrictions by from .25 hours 
to 2.25 hours at the time of the crash. Id. An investigation by state officials found 
nothing wrong with the semi-truck before the crash. Id. 
The truck driver was charged with three counts of negligent homicide, each a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (2003). The electronic 
docket from State v. Dalrymple, Case No. 051906928 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct, Salt Lake 
County), is attached hereto as Addendum F. Following a one-day bench trial, the truck 
driver was found guilty on all three counts. Addendum F at 4-5. The truck driver was 
sentenced to three one-year terms of incarceration. Id. at 6-7. The three terms were 
imposed consecutively. Id. at 6. The jail sentences were suspended and probation 
imposed. Id. at 7. 
C. The Sentencing Hearing, 
The Utah Division of Adult Probation and Parole prepared and submitted the PSR 
in this case prior to the defendant's sentencing hearing. See R. 71. The PSR references 
and describes the semi-truck accident on three pages. 
• Page four of the PSR describes the semi-truck accident, which, according to the 
PSR, "resulted] from the defendant's actions." 
• Page five of the PSR notes the semi-truck driver's criminal convictions and 
sentence imposed as a result of the semi-truck crash. 
• Page nine of the PSR reproduces a letter written by the daughter of one of the 
persons killed by the truck driver's criminal negligence. PSR at 9. The letter 
itself is contained in the court file, at R. 61. According to the daughter, her father 
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"would still be with us if Mr. Hooper had not set off this terrible chain of events.5' 
Id. While urging imposition of the "maximum sentences" on the defendant, it 
urges "mercy" for the semi-truck driver: "In the court sentencing for our accident, 
we plead for mercy for Mr. Dalrymple, the truck driver, but for Mr. Hooper, we 
plead for justice." Id. 
Defense counsel moved to strike these references to the semi-truck crash, arguing 
that the truck driver's failure to stop constituted a superseding cause, and the truck 
driver's criminal negligence caused the three deaths and nine injuries. R. 84:3-4. 
Because the truck driver's failure to stop was the single proximate cause of that crash, 
argued defense counsel, the deaths and injuries that followed should not be attributed to 
the defendant. Id. 
The sentencing court denied the motion as to the description of the truck crash and 
the letter from the daughter of one of a truck-crash victim, set for in the PSR at pages 4 
and 9. R. 84:4. 
The court, however, granted the motion to strike only as to the note regarding the 
truck driver's criminal prosecution on page 5 of the PSR. R. 84:4. 
Defense counsel twice objected to permitting comments at the sentencing hearing 
from a man whose daughter and daughter-in-law were killed by the truck driver's 
criminal negligence. R. 84:4-5, 13. The sentencing court overruled both objections. R. 
84:5, 13. The man gave a very emotional account of his losses, and he attributed them to 
the defendant. See R. 84:13-15. 
The PSR made no recommendation about running the defendant's two sentences 
concurrently or consecutively. See PSR at 1. The prosecution recommended that they 
run concurrently. R. 84:16. Defense counsel argued that they run concurrently. R. 
84:18-19. The court ordered them to run consecutively. R. 69. 
D. The Court and Prosecutor Blame the Defendant for the Semi-
Truck Crash, 
In response to defense counsel's motion to strike reference to the semi-truck crash 
from the defendant's PSR, the district court, Leslie A. Lewis, presiding, responded that 
the accident occurred "[t]hanks to him," meaning the defendant. R. 84:3. The court 
further opined about the semi-truck crash, "[Tjhis is all because of your client. . . . If 
your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic wouldn't have been stopped and I 
doubt if any other accident [inaudible]." Id. The court struck from the PSJR. the note 
regarding the truck driver's criminal convictions, yet refused to strike either the PSR's 
description of the semi-truck crash, or the letter from the daughter of a man killed by the 
truck driver's criminal negligence. R. 84 at 4. 
In response to defense counsel's first motion to prohibit a man from testifying 
about the deaths of his daughter and daughter-in-law who were killed as a result of the 
truck driver's criminal negligence, the court declared: "I'm sorry, but I view this as 
linked. I don't think that [semi-truck] accident would have occurred but for your client's 
conduct." R. 84:5. 
In response to defense counsel's second objection to allowing the man aggrieved 
by the deaths of his daughter and daughter-in-law in the semi-truck crash to speak, the 
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court reiterated: "Well, once again I will say very clearly that none of this would have 
occurred but for your client's conduct." R. 84:13. 
In response to defense counsel's observation that the PSR did not address 
concurrent versus consecutive sentences, the court observed, "We're not talking about 
one life, we're talking about three to five lives." R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 3 
(addressing the two fatalities from the defendant's accident). The court also referenced 
the defendant as one "who wipes out all these vehicles[.]" R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 2-
3 (defendant's accident damages only one other vehicle). 
The prosecutor lumped together the defendant's accident and the semi-truck crash 
in discussing the victims of each: "I have never met a more decent group of people than 
the victims of these cases." R. 84:16 (emphasis added). The prosecutor argued for 
prison based, in part, upon the deaths and one particular injury caused by the truck 
driver's criminal negligence: 
This didn't just affect these two families, it affected the families of everyone 
killed, of everyone -there's a 16 year old girl, I don't even know if this was 
mentioned, there was a 16 year old girl who was injured in the trucking 
accident who was paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck 
down. There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers to 
those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are affected by Mr. 
Hooper's crime. 
R. 84:16-17. 
The prosecutor conceded that the defendant's accident was not the legal cause of 
the semi-truck crash, and yet attributed the consequences of that "malay" [sic] to the 
defendant: 
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Regardless of whether they can say that it was a direct result or if it was an 
incident that happened on 1-80 that was just a maylay [sic], talking with 
Highway Patrol Troopers who were choking back tears at our trial when [the 
truck driver] was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his life. 
And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether or not we can charge 
this as a crime, I believe it is immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was 
his responsibility. 
R. 84:17. 
Also in the course of the hearing, the sentencing court implied that the defendant 
was a "monster." R. 84:8. It described the incident as "the most unconscionable, 
outrageous conduct I have seen in a long time." R. 84:20. It concluded the hearing as 
follows: "Mr. Hooper, I don't even have the words to describe what I think of you and 
your conduct. So perhaps I'll [inaudible]. You deserve to go to prison right now and 
stay for the rest of your natural life. Put him in cuffs." R. 84:21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The court violated the defendant's due process rights by basing its 
sentence upon irrelevant information. 
The defendant herein caused a two-car collision and ultimately pleaded guilty to 
offenses based thereon. In the half hour following the defendant's collision, traffic 
backed up for approximately 1.45 miles as medical and law enforcement personnel 
responded to the scene. On this clear sunny afternoon, the driver of a semi-truck plowed 
into the rear of the stopped traffic, killing three persons and injuring nine more. The 
truck driver was convicted for causing these deaths through his criminally negligent 
inattention. 
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At defendant's sentencing hearing, the only issue was whether to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences. Both defense counsel and the state recommended 
concurrent sentences. The court, however, focused almost exclusively upon the harm 
caused by the semi-truck crash and imposed consecutive sentences. 
That a professional driver on a clear afternoon would plow into a line of stopped 
traffic was not a foreseeable result of the defendant's offense. The truck driver's 
independent and unforeseen criminal negligence constitutes a superseding cause of the 
semi-truck crash. A superseding cause means the defendant was not responsible for that 
crash. That crash and the consequent harm, therefore, were irrelevant to the statutory 
factors properly considered when deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences. 
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon relevant information. The trial 
court violated the defendant's due process rights by imposing consecutive sentences 
based upon a crash for which the defendant was not responsible. By so doing, the court 
abused its discretion. This abuse was not harmless. 
Pursuant to the due process violation, the defendant's sentence may be vacated 
and this case remanded for resentencing based only upon relevant factors. Pursuant to 
Ut. R. App. P. 11(h) this court may instruct the trial court to remove all misstatements 
about the defendant's alleged responsibility for the semi-truck accident from the record. 
POINT II: The trial court violated section 77-18-l(6)(a) when it refused to 
remove irrelevant and inaccurate information from the presentence report (PSR). 
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Section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a sentencing court to resolve on the record any 
challenges to the accuracy or relevancy of sentencing factors set forth in the PSR. 
In this case, the defendant objected to the PSR because the semi-truck crash was 
irrelevant to determining an appropriate sentence, and because statements making the 
defendant responsible for the semi-truck crash were inaccurate. The court found that the 
semi-truck crash was relevant to determining the defendant's sentence, and that it was 
accurate to attribute that crash and consequent harm to the defendant. 
However, as established in Point I of this brief, the semi-truck crash was not 
relevant to determining an appropriate sentence. Nor was it accurate to say the defendant 
caused that crash and consequent harm. 
As a result of the sentencing court's misapplication of section 77-18-l(6)(a), this 
case may be remanded to remove from the PSR all reference to the semi-truck crash. 
Because the court's focus on the semi-truck crash also affected the defendant's sentence, 
the court on remand may revise the defendant's sentence accordingly. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS BY RUNNING HIS SENTENCES 
CONSECUTIVELY BASED IN LARGE PART UPON THE SEMI-
TRUCK CRASH. 
Because the defendant did not cause the semi-truck crash, that crash and 
subsequent harm are irrelevant to determining the defendant's sentence. 
c
"[S]o long as basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural 
fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in considering any and all 
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information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence.5" State v. Johnson, 2006 
UT App 3, If 7, P.3d 282 (quoting State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quotations and citations omitted)). Where, however, the sentencing court does not 
afford the defendant "'basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural 
fairness,'" no discretion is due. Patience, 944 P.2d at 389 (quoting State v. Sweat, 722 
P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986)); see also State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (inherent unfairness in the sentencing process constitutes abuse of discretion) 
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon "reasonably reliable and 
relevant information." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (citing Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7)). "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other 
things, it fails to consider all legally relevant factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8, 
40 P.3d 626. It follows that a trial court also abuses its discretion when it considers 
irrelevant factors. See id; see also State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) 
(holding that "fundamental fairness" requires that a sentence be based only upon 
"accurate information"). 
In particular, due process prohibits determining a sentence based upon a crime for 
which a defendant is not responsible. See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 n.2; see also United 
States v. Hack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[G]iv[ing] significant weight to an 
improper or irrelevant factor" is unreasonable); United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d 1284, 
1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (giving weight to a sentencing factor irrelevant to legislative 
guidelines constitutes abuse of discretion); State v. McFadden, 638 S.E.2d 633, 634 (N.C. 
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App. 2007) ("If the record discloses that the court considered irrelevant and improper 
matters in determining the severity of the sentence, the presumption of regularity is 
overcome, and the sentence is in violation of the defendant's rights" (quoting State v. 
Boone, 239 S.E.2d 459, 465 (N.C. 1977)). 
The premium on reliability and relevance is especially high in the sentencing 
context when "specific factual issues must be resolved." State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 
1064, 1071 (Utah 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Tryba, 2000 
UTApp230,Tfl9, 8P.3d274. 
As detailed below, a subsequent accident caused by the unforeseen criminal action 
of another actor is not relevant to determining the defendant's sentence (§ A). Because 
due process requires that a sentence be based only upon relevant information, the court's 
reliance upon the semi-truck accident constitutes an abuse of discretion (§ B). The 
court's violation of the defendant's due process rights at sentencing was not harmless (§ 
C). 
A. The Semi-Truck Crash and Its Consequences Were Irrelevant to the 
Defendant's Offense and Sentence, 
The sentencing court's finding that the defendant caused the semi-truck crash was 
clearly erroneous, and the sentencing court erred in concluding the crash was relevant to 
the defendant's sentence.2 
2
 The evidence that the defendant caused the semi-truck crash is best summarized as, if 
the defendant had not caused a traffic back up, then there would have been no stopped 
traffic for the criminally negligent truck driver to plow into: 
• The defendant's accident on westbound 1-80 occurred before 5 p.m. See PSR at 2 
(state troopers arrived at the scene at 5:03 p.m.). 
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1. Where the only issue is whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences, relevant sentencing factors include "the gravity and circumstances 
of the offense, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
In Utah, general factors relevant to determining a sentence include 
"rehabilitation," "deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." Rhodes, 818 
P.2d at 1051 (citing Scott W. Rodgers, Binding Sentencing Guidelines: A Means of 
Controlling Utah's Prison Population, 1990 Utah L.Rev. 309 (1990)). 
When determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive prison sentences, 
a court must consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offense, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). Utah appellate courts will overturn imposition of consecutive 
sentences where a sentencing court fails to adhere to the criteria set forth in section 76-3-
401(2). Kg, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998), State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 
244-45 (Utah 1995); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993). 
To assist in imposing an "appropriate" sentence, the court may receive testimony 
from a crime victim regarding "the background, character, and conduct of a person 
convicted of an offensef.]" Utah Const, art. I, § 27 (Supp. 2006). In the context of 
• By 5:30 p.m., traffic on eastbound 1-80 backed up for approximately 1.45 miles 
behind the defendant's accident. Id. at 4. 
• At approximately 5:30 p.m., the semi-truck crashed into the backed up traffic. Id. 
In the ensuing mayhem caused by the semi-truck's failure to slow or stop, three 
persons died, and nine more were injured. Id. 
• Based upon the truck driver's failure to slow before reaching the stopped traffic 
on this clear, sunny day, he was charged with, and found guilty of, three counts of 
negligent homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (2003). The 
electronic docket from State v. Dalrymple, Case No. 051906928 (3d Jud. Dist. 
Ct, Salt Lake County), is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
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'sentencing' hearings conducted by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, a "victim" is a 
person directly affected by a particular "offense": 
"Victim" means: 
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or class A 
misdemeanor offense, and regard which offense a hearing is held under this 
chapter; or 
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the offense 
for which a hearing is held under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (13) (2003). See State v. Labrum, 870 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 
1993) (comparing judicial imposition of sentence with the Board's initial calculation of a 
release date, and concluding, "parole is sentencing"). 
The defendant herein was convicted of one count of automobile homicide, and one 
count of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. R. 47. Pursuant 
to the foregoing legal principles, the defendant is responsible for the harm and damage he 
caused to the single car with which he collided, and for injuries suffered by the occupants 
of that car. This damage and harm are relevant to whether the defendant should receive 
concurrent or consecutive sentences because they relate to the "the gravity and 
circumstances of the [defendant's] offense, the number of victims, and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) 
(2003). 
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2. The semi-truck crash constitutes a superseding cause directly flowing from 
the criminally negligent inattention of the truck driver, and is irrelevant to 
the defendant's sentence. 
In contrast to the defendant's responsibility for the two-car accident caused by his 
offense, the defendant was not responsible for the harm caused by the truck driver's 
superseding criminal acts. 
In Utah, in both criminal and civil contexts, the "uniformly recognized" definition 
of proximate cause is "the cause which through its natural and foreseeable consequence, 
unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause, produces the injury which would not have 
occurred but for that cause." State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980). "[W]here 
the death or injury caused by the defendant's conduct is a foreseeable and natural result 
of that conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the 
defendant criminally responsible." State v. Browne, 854 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. App. 2004) 
(quoting State v. Wassil, 648 A.2d 548 (Conn. 1995). 
However, an intervening cause supersedes the defendant's criminal responsibility 
when it is "unforeseeable and one in which the defendant does not participate^]" State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 1993) (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 6, at 363 (1991)); 
see also State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 219, 226 (Wash. 1984) ("[T]o escape liability, 
defendant would have to show contributory negligence was a supervening cause without 
which her negligence would not have caused the accident"). Discussed below are two 
cases in which the defendants should have foreseen the harm their acts caused, and one in 
which the harm was not foreseeable and thus was attributable to a superseding cause. 
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In State v. Hamblin, the defendant was drag racing his brother, ran a stop sign, and 
killed the driver of a car in the intersection who had the right-of-way. 676 P.2d 376, 377 
(Utah 1983). The Court concluded that while the victim's behavior might have been a 
"concurrent" cause of the accident, the defendant was legally responsible because he was 
going too fast to stop for an intersection at which it was foreseeable that a driver with the 
right-of-way would be present. Id. at 379. 
In State v. Hallett, during a night of partying, the defendant bent over a stop sign 
so that the sign was not visible to northbound traffic. 619P.2d at 337. The next 
morning, a northbound driver proceeded through the intersection and was broadsided by 
another car that enjoyed the right-of-way. The northbound driver died from the 
consequent injuries. Id. The defendant argued he was not legally responsible for the 
northbound driver's death because that driver might have been driving faster than the 25-
mile-per-hour limit. Id. at 338. Noting that even a speeding driver might have stopped at 
the intersection had the stop sign been visible, the Court found the northbound driver 
was, at most, a concurrent cause of the accident. See id. The defendant was legally 
responsible because the northbound driver's failure to stop at the intersection was the 
foreseeable result of vandalizing the stop sign. Id. at 339. 
The plaintiff in Bansasine v. Bodell brought suit on behalf of the passenger in a car 
who was shot and killed by the driver of a second car. 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). In response to aggressive driving by the second driver, the driver of the victim's 
car tailgated the second car, flashed its bright lights at the second car, and sped by the 
second car. Id. When the second car then pulled along side the victim's car, the victim 
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made an obscene gesture at the second driver. Id. The second driver pulled a gun, and 
shot and killed the victim. Id. On behalf of the victim, the plaintiff sued both the driver 
of the victim's car and the driver of the second car claiming their negligence caused the 
victim's death. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the driver of 
the victim's car, concluding that the second driver's use of a gun constituted a 
superseding cause of the victim's death, thereby absolving the first driver of liability for 
his negligent behavior. Id. 
In Bansasine, this court observed the basic definition of proximate cause, and 
added, "'[Proximate cause] is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the injury.'" 927 P.2d at 676 (quoting Clark v. 
Farmer Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). It noted that 
identifying the proximate cause of an injury becomes a question of law "'where 
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on 
proximate causation.'" Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 
482, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). This court then described a superseding cause as 
including a more recent criminal act that was unforeseeable to the prior actor: 
Utah courts have consistently recognized that "ca more recent negligent [or 
criminal/intentional] act may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent 
actor under the proper circumstances.'" Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488 (citation 
omitted). These circumstances arise when the more recent negligent or 
criminal act was unforeseeable to the first negligent actor. Id. If, on the 
other hand, the subsequent criminal or negligent act was "foreseeable to the 
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes and the prior actor is not 
absolved of liability." Id.; see also Mitchell [v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 
P.2d 240,] 246 (Utah 1985). 
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Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677 (bracketed citation added; other alteration in original); 
compare State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Steffensen to 
arrive at the same definitions of superseding cause and concurrent cause in the criminal 
context, and also noting the issue turns on foreseeability). 
Applying these standards to the facts of Bansasine, this court affirmed the first 
driver's dismissal, concluding that while his rude driving indeed set in motion the events 
leading to the victim's death, it was not reasonably foreseeable that another driver would 
shoot someone in response to rude driving. Id. at 677. It observed, "If such a response 
were so common as to make it foreseeable, the streets and highways of this country 
would be empty." Id. It concluded, "[T]he shooting was an extraordinary reaction to 
rude driving, thereby making the result unforeseeable [to the driver of the victim's car]." 
Id. n2. 
This case most resembles Bansasine. Like the driver of the victim's car in 
Bansasine, the defendant's offense herein constituted a link in the chain of events leading 
up to the semi-truck crash. However, a professional semi-truck driver, more than thirty 
minutes after the defendant's accident, failing to notice a 1.45 mile traffic jam on a clear 
sunny day, and plowing his truck into the rear of the stopped cars, is no more foreseeable 
than a driver firing a gun at another car because of rude behavior and obscene gestures. 
If such inattention by professional truck drivers occurred frequently enough to be 
foreseeable, imagine the carnage that would litter our roadsides every time traffic backed 
up because of a red light or stop sign, highway construction, or rush hour. 
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B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Imposing Consecutive 
Sentences Based upon the Irrelevant Semi-Truck Crash. 
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon relevant, not irrelevant, 
information. See Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 & n.2. Basing a sentence upon harm caused 
by the unforeseeable, independent, criminal negligence of another actor constitutes the 
epitome of inherent unfairness, and thus an abuse of discretion. See Rhodes, 181 P.2d at 
1051. 
The truck driver caused the semi-truck crash through his independent and 
unforeseeable criminal negligence, not the defendant. Supra Point I, § A(2). Thus the 
harm flowing from the semi-truck crash has no more relevance to the "gravity and 
circumstances" of the defendant's offense than a third crash 1.45 miles away and thirty 
(plus) minutes later on another highway would have. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
The defendant is not responsible for the victims of the truck driver's unforeseeable 
criminal negligence. See id. Nor should the defendant's "history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs" be evaluated based upon harm caused by another's unforeseen 
negligence. See id. 
Punishing the defendant for harm that is irrelevant to his offense, and for a 
criminal act he did not commit, is inherently unfair and violates due process. Therefore, 
the trial abused its discretion. 
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C. The Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion Was Not Harmless. 
The trial court's abuse of discretion requires the sentence to be vacated unless it is 
harmless. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at ^ 36.3 The following discussion establishes 
that the court focused upon the irrelevant semi-truck crash in deciding to impose 
consecutive sentences (§ 1), and this improper focus harmed the defendant (§ 2). 
1. The semi-truck crash influenced the court's sentencing determination. 
With contributions from the PSR and the prosecutor, the sentencing court tied the 
defendant to the truck crash with a short rope. 
The PSR, at 4, detailed the truck crash as the "continuation of events[ ] resulting 
from the defendant's actions." The PSR, at 9, included the touching letter from the 
daughter of a man killed in the truck crash. (That letter is in the court record at R. 61.) 
The prosecutor lumped together the defendant's accident and the semi-truck crash 
in discussing the victims of each: "I have never met a more decent group of people than 
the victims of these cases." R. 84:16 (emphasis added). The prosecutor argued for 
prison based, in large part, upon the deaths and one particular injury caused by the semi-
truck crash: 
3
 In Wanosik, the state urged this court to apply a plain error standard of review to the 
defendant's Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) claim because it was not preserved at trial. 2001 UT 
App 241 at *H 28 n. 11. Plain error requires the defendant to establish prejudice. State v. 
Cruz, 2005 UT 45, U 16, 122 P.3d 543. Instead, this court in Wanosik applied a harmless 
error standard of review to both the defendant's Rule 22(a) sentencing claim and his due 
process sentencing claim. 2001 UT App 241 at ^ 28 n.l 1 (holding preservation was not 
required to pursue a Rule 22(a) claim when the sentence at issue is illegal pursuant to 
Rule 22(e)), j^ 33 (finding noncompliance with Rule 22(a) "was not harmless," vacating 
the sentence, and remanding for resentencing); \ 36 (finding the due process violation in 
sentencing "was not harmless"). As detailed in this section of the brief, the trial court's 
abuse of discretion, i.e., violating the defendant's due process rights, caused harm. 
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This didn't just affect these two families, it affected the families of everyone 
killed, of everyone - there's a 16 year old girl, I don't even know if this was 
mentioned, there was a 16 year old girl who was injured in the trucking 
accident who was paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck 
down. There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers to 
those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are affected by Mr. 
Hooper's crime. 
R. 84:16-17. 
The prosecutor conceded that the defendant's accident was not the legal cause of 
the semi-truck crash, and yet attributed the consequences of that "malay" [sic] to the 
defendant: 
Regardless of whether they can say that it was a direct result or if it was an 
incident that happened on 1-80 that was just a maylay [sic], talking with 
Highway Patrol Troopers who were choking back tears at our trial when [the 
truck driver] was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his life. 
And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether or not we can charge 
this as a crime, I believe it is immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was 
his responsibility. 
R. 84:17. 
The sentencing court was the most adamant in insisting that the defendant herein 
was responsible for the truck driver's criminally negligent inattention. It is significant 
that, at the sentencing hearing, the only unresolved issue was whether to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences. R. 84:18 (defense counsel conceding the defendant 
will be sentenced to prison, and identifying the only issue as whether the sentences will 
run concurrently or consecutively). The prosecutor also recommended concurrent 
sentences. R. 84:16. The PSR did not recommend consecutive sentences. PSRatl 
(recommending, without more, that "the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison 
for the term prescribed by law"). 
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The sentencing court, however, relied in large part upon the truck crash in 
imposing consecutive prison terms over the prosecutor's recommendation. In response to 
defense counsel's motion to strike reference to the truck crash from the defendant's PSR, 
the court responded that the accident occurred "[t]hanks to him," meaning the defendant. 
R. 84:3. Of the truck crash, the court declared: "[TJhis is all because of your client.... 
If your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic wouldn't have been stopped and I 
doubt if any other accident [inaudible]." Id. 
Especially telling is the court's ready agreement to strike from the PSR the 
paragraph describing the truck driver's three convictions based upon his criminal 
negligence, but not the PSR's description of the semi-truck crash, fatalities and injuries, 
or the letter from the daughter of a man killed in the semi-truck crash. R. 84:4. This 
course cleanses the defendant's PSR of any mention of the truck driver's responsibility 
for the semi-truck crash and ensuing harm, and yet leaves intact every reference to the 
deaths, injuries and victim impact it caused along with the defendant's alleged causal 
influence. Transparent is the court's rationale underlying these decisions. 
Then, in response to defense counsel's first motion to prohibit a man from 
testifying about the deaths of his daughter and daughter-in-law caused the semi-truck 
crash, the court declared: "I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. I don't think that [semi-
truck] accident would have occurred but for your client's conduct." R. 84:5. 
In response to defense counsel's second objection to allowing the man aggrieved 
by the truck crash to speak, the court reiterated: "Well, once again I will say very clearly 
that none of this would have occurred but for your client's conduct." R. 84:13. 
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The court observed, "We're not talking about one life, we're talking about three to 
five lives." R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 3 (addressing the two fatalities from the 
defendant's accident). The court referenced the defendant as one "who wipes out all 
these vehicles[.]" R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 2-3 (referencing damage only to his and 
one other vehicle caused by the defendant's accident). 
2. The court's improper focus caused harm. 
Plainly obvious was the court's focus on the truck crash in weighing "the gravity 
and circumstances of the offense, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant" in imposing consecutive sentences. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). This harmed the defendant in three ways. 
a. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences. The court's focus on the truck crash in 
imposing consecutive sentences harmed the defendant. While the PSR remained neutral 
on the issue, defense counsel - and even the prosecutor - recommended concurrent 
sentences. R. 84:18-19 (noting the PSR did not address the issue), 16 (confirming the 
prosecutor's recommendation for concurrent sentences), 18 (defense counsel arguing for 
concurrent sentences). 
Despite this, the court imposed consecutive sentences. In so doing (as detailed 
supra, Point I, § C(l)), the court based its sentencing decision in large part upon the truck 
crash. In applying section 76-3-401(2), the court considered more than just the one other 
vehicle damaged in the defendant's accident, and more than the two lives lost in that 
accident, when evaluating the "gravity and circumstances, [and] the number of 
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victims[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); R. 84:19 (citing more than two lives lost and 
more than one vehicle damaged in support of consecutive sentences). 
The court also factored in the effects of the truck crash when evaluating the 
defendant's "history, character, and rehabilitative needs[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(2); see R. 84:19-21. To wit, the court effectively called the defendant a "monster," 
R. 84:8, described the incident as "the most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have 
seen in a long time," id. at 20, and voiced hope that the defendant die in prison: "Mr. 
Hooper, I don't even have the words to describe what I think of you and your conduct. 
So perhaps I'll [inaudible]. You deserve to go to prison right now and stay for the rest of 
your natural life. Put him in cuffs." Id. at 21. 
b. Effect on Release Date. The defendant will be harmed when facing the Board 
of Pardons and Parole if he is forced to answer for three deaths and nine injuries that his 
accident did not cause. The Board effectively is a sentencing authority. See Labrum, 870 
P.2d at 908 ("parole is sentencing"). While the trial court sets the minimum sentence, the 
Board actually determines when the offender will be released from prison. State v. Smith, 
909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995). The Board relies upon the PSR. See e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-13(2) (2003) (the Board "shall" receive the PSR); Labrum at 903 (noting 
that at initial parole hearing, "the Board considered . . . the presentence investigation 
report prepared for the sentencing judge"); Utah Sentencing Commission, Utah Sentence 
and Release Guidelines, § Policy implicit in the guidelines ("Presentence investigations 
are beneficial to the Board of Pardons and Parole"). In this case, detailed descriptions of 
the mayhem, death and injury caused by the truck driver's criminal negligence, and 
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emotional statements from victims of the truck crash, are contained in the file, R. 61, 
84:13-15,andthePSRat4,9. 
The Board also will affirmatively contact "victims" of the defendant's offense, and 
their survivors, and invite them to speak at the hearing at which the defendant's release 
date initially is set. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(2) (Supp. 2006), § 77-27-9.5(2)-(4) 
(2003). Absent intervention by this court, said "victims" may include all those affected 
by the truck crash. As illustrated by letters and statements, e.g., R. 61, 84:13-15, PSR at 
9, persons victimized by the truck crash believe the crash was caused by the defendant, 
and are prepared to provide gut-wrenching testimony about their losses. 
Similarly, the Board may receive letters from the sentencing court especially 
detailing the court's opinion regarding "the character of the offender or any mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances connected with the offense for which the offender has been 
convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (2003); see also Labrum, 870 P.2d at 907 
("[T]he Board should evaluate the aggravating and mitigating circumstances noted by the 
judge") (quoting Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines). In this case, the sentencing 
court declared: "[I]t is my intention to write a letter to the Board of Pardons anytime [the 
defendant] comes up for parole and indicate to the Board of Pardons that I don't think he 
ought to be released one day early." R. 84:20. No speculation is necessary to understand 
what the tone of those letters will be if this court does not correct the mistaken belief that 
the defendant was responsible for the truck crash. The sentencing court believes the 
defendant is a "monster," R. 84:8; it blames the defendant for both accidents, which it 
describes as "the most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have seen in a long time," 
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id. at 20; and it hopes the defendant dies in prison: "You deserve to go to prison right 
now and stay for the rest of your natural life." Id. at 21. 
The Board enjoys "absolute discretion in parole decisions[.]" Labrum, 870 P.2d at 
906. It necessarily considers the nature of the defendant's crime when setting a release 
date. Id. at 908. If the defendant must still answer for the three deaths and nine injuries 
caused by the truck driver's criminally negligent inattention, all of which will be 
presented by the PSR, with probable amplification from the court's letters and emotional 
victim testimony, declaring the defendant responsible for the semi-truck crash may not 
reasonably be said to be harmless. 
c. Legitimacy of Sentencing Process. The defendant's interests, as well as 
important societal interests, are ill-served by a sentencing process infected by 
consideration of unfair and inaccurate factors: 
Beyond the issue of accuracy, there is also a concern for legitimacy that has 
always animated due process doctrine in the criminal law. 
The interests of both society and criminal offenders are best served 
when fairness and accuracy are assured at all stages of the 
sentencing and correctional process. An offender's perception of 
fairness in the criminal justice system is thought to promote 
rehabilitation. Accurate sentencing and parole decisions also further 
society's interest in ensuring that offenders will be returned to 
society neither sooner nor later than is appropriate. 
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 910 (quoting Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in Presentence 
Investigation Reports, 91 Yale L.J. 1225, 1241-42 (1982)). 
Attributing the harm caused by the truck driver's unforeseen, extraordinary and 
superseding criminal acts to the defendant is decidedly "unfair." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1215 
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(holding a defendant liable for the unforeseen and extraordinary behavior is "unfair"). 
Insofar as the harm from the truck crash is irrelevant to the defendant's sentence, 
attributing that harm to the defendant is also inaccurate. It is unreasonable to conclude 
that this illegitimate attribution is harmless. 
The defendant requests two forms of relief pursuant to the court's abuse of 
discretion in violating the defendant's due process rights. First, when consecutive 
sentences have been imposed based upon improper application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-401(2), the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing consistent 
with the appellate court's decision. E.g., State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938-39 (Utah 
1998) (remanding with instructions to consider relevant mitigating factors). Here, the 
case may be remanded with instructions to resentence the defendant only based upon 
relevant sentencing factors. 
Second, this court on its own initiative, or the trial court on its, may order 
misstatements in the record corrected even after the record on appeal has been certified: 
If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or 
accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the 
appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct 
that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a 
supplemental record be certified and transmitted. 
UtahR.App.P. 11(h) (2006). 
The letter, R. 61, and the PSR at 4, 5, 9, misstate the defendant's responsibility for 
the semi-truck crash. As noted immediately above, these misstatements were material to 
the trial court's abuse of discretion in sentencing the defendant based upon irrelevant 
information. This court, therefore, may direct that the district court, on remand, correct 
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these portions of the record to remove these misstatements. Pursuant to the process 
outlined in Rule 11(h), the trial court would "serve on the parties a statement of the 
proposed changes," to which either party "may serve objections[.]" Utah R. App. P. 
11(h). At that time no need would exist for a "supplemental record [to] be certified and 
transmitted" back to this court. See id. Rather the trial court would proceed with 
resentencing. 
POINT II: THE COURT VIOLATED SECTION 77-18-l(6)(a) IN 
CONCLUDING THE PSR's ATTRIBUTION OF HARM 
FROM THE SEMI-TRUCK CRASH TO DEFENDANT WAS 
ACCURATE AND RELEVANT, 
In response to the defendant's objections to the relevancy of the PSR's references 
to the semi-truck crash, and the accuracy of the attributions of the harm from that crash to 
the defendant, the sentencing court erred in finding the PSR to be both relevant and 
accurate. 
Upon objection to the accuracy of a PSR, section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires the 
sentencing court to "make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record": 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to 
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall 
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant 
an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the 
report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot 
be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy 
on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (the Utah Legislature amended this statue in its general 
2007 session; subsection (6)(a), however, was not affected. UT Legis. 218 (2007)). 
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The defendant's PSR three times references the semi-truck crash. Page four of the 
PSR describes the semi-truck accident, which, according to the PSR, "resulted] from the 
defendant's actions." Page five of the PSR notes the semi-truck driver's criminal 
convictions and sentence imposed as a result of the semi-truck crash. Page 9 of the PSR 
reproduces a letter written by the daughter of a person killed in the truck crash. The 
original of this letter is located at R. 61. 
Defense counsel objected to the PSR's references to the semi-truck crash on pages 
4 and 5. R. 84:3 (arguing that the description of the truck crash was "not relevant to Mr. 
Hooper's charges), 4 ("I think [the semi-truck crash] was an intervening crime that was 
committed and has nothing to do with this case"). Defense counsel also objected to the 
inclusion of the victim impact letter on page nine of the PSR. R. 84:4. 
The court overruled the objection as to the crash's description and PSR's 
attribution to the defendant all harm therefrom as set forth on page four. R. 84:4. It 
overruled the objection to the letter describing two fatalities caused by the semi-truck 
crash. Id. However, it sustained the objection as to the PSR's reference to the crash on 
page 5, thus striking from the PSR only that the truck driver was criminally prosecuted 
and convicted for causing three deaths as a result of his criminal negligence. Id. 
In overruling the defendant's objection to those portions of the PSR that describe 
the harm caused by the semi-truck crash and attribute that harm to the defendant, the 
sentencing court necessarily reached two conclusions: First, that it was accurate to 
attribute the semi-truck crash and subsequent harm to the defendant; second, that the 
crash and harm were relevant to determining the defendant's sentence. See R. 84:3, 4, 5. 
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In response to defense counsel's first attempt to strike reference to the semi-truck crash 
from the defendant's PSR, the court responded that the accident occurred "[tjhanks to 
him," meaning the defendant. R. 84:3. In response to defense counsel's second attempt, 
the court declared: "I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. I don't think that Dalrymple 
accident, for want of a better way to expressing it [sic], would have occurred but for your 
client's conduct." R. 84:5. 
As detailed in Point I, § C(2), of this brief, the court erred in finding accurate the 
PSR's attribution of harm from the semi-truck crash to the defendant. Thus the court also 
erred in finding that crash and harm were relevant to its determination of the defendant's 
sentence. Id. 
Two remedies are available for a court's mistaken application of section 77-18-
l(6)(a). First, where a defendant challenges the court's noncompliance with section 77-
18-l(6)(a), but not the sentence itself, the case may be remanded to correct the PSR. E.g., 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, If 41, 973 P.2d 404 (noting objection to the court's 
noncompliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a), but not to the resultant sentence), f^ 46 
(remanding with instructions to comply). Where a defendant also challenges the resultant 
sentence, the case may be remanded not only to correct the PSR, but also to "revise the 
sentence accordingly." State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \ 31, 94 P.3d 295. 
The defendant in this case seeks remand to correct the PSR by removing all 
references to the semi-truck crash, and also by removing all inaccurate attributions of 
harm from the crash to the defendant. Additionally, because these inaccurate and 
irrelevant factors influenced the court's determination of the defendant's sentence, supra, 
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Point I, § C(l), the court on remand may re-determine the sentence absent consideration 
of the semi-truck crash and consequent harm based upon the corrected record. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the sentencing court's unconstitutional reliance upon irrelevant 
sentencing factors, the defendant requests that his sentence be vacated, and this case 
remanded to remove from the record all reference to the irrelevant information, and to 
conduct a new sentencing hearing at which only relevant factors are considered. 
In the alternative, pursuant to the court's erroneous application of section 77-18-
l(6)(a), the defendant requests that this case be remanded to remove from the PSR all 
inaccurate and irrelevant information, and to revise the defendant's sentence should the 
court determine that revision is appropriate based upon the corrected record. 
DATED t h i ^ ^ a y of April, 2007. 
The Salt Lake-Legal Defender Asspciation 
John Pace 
Michael D. Misner 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW E HOOPER, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051907365 FS 
Judge: LESLIE A LEWIS 




Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MISNER, MICHAEL D 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 23, 1942 
Video 
Tape Number: 11:21:33 
CHARGES 
1. AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 08/01/2006 Guilty 
2. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 08/01/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant' s conviction of AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
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.Case No: 051907365 
Date: Oct 20, 2006 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Count 2 is consecutive to count 1. 
SENTENCE FINE 




Charge # 2 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $4275.00 
Total Principal Due: $9275.00 
Plus Interest 
Attorney Fees Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Pay fine to The Court. 
The Court orders the defendant to pay full restitution for all the 
victims. The State is to provide an amount owing in 45 days. The 
Defense has 30 days to file an objection. 
Page 2 > 
i i\ r\ 
Case No: 051907365 
Date: Oct 20, 2006 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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ANDREW E. HOOPER, 
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Case No. 051907365 FS 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 20, 2006 
2 HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 For the Plaintiff: PATRICIA S. CASSELL 
4 For the Defendant: MICHAEL D. MISNER 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: All right, let's do the Hooper case. 
7 MS. CASSELL: Your Honor, in the foyer are some of 
8 the victims. If I could get them. Also the victims have 
9 some children. I said that you may not let them be here, 
10 but-
11 THE COURT: If the children are quiet they're 
12 welcomed to be here. 
13 MS. CASSELL: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: I'll let you get them before we start, 
15 Okay, this is the time set for sentencing in the 
16 matter of State v. Andrew Hooper, 051907365. This is the 
17 time set for sentencing. I have reviewed a pre-sentence 
18 report and an assessment - excuse me, that's on somebody 
19 else. I've reviewed the pre-sentence report twice now and 
20 read it very carefully. I'm conversant with its content. 

































There are some things 
: I 
Are 
am, Your Honor, that' rs right. 
there any inaccuracies or omissions 
Your Honor, there are no inaccuracies. 
that 








. aren't there but we 
we go along. 


















THE COURT: I'm happy to hear your remarks. 
MR. MISNER: Your Honor, a couple of things before 
I really get started. There are no legal reasons why we 
should not proceed with sentencing today. I guess I am 
asking the Court to not sentence Mr. Hooper today because our 
request is going to be that the Court send him to the prison 
for a diagnostic. 
THE COURT: I respectfully decline. 
MR. MISNER: There are some things, although there 
are no errors, there are certainly things I do not believe 
should be in the report, and I'm going to ask the Court to 
strike them. 
THE COURT: What would those be? 
1 MR. MISNER: On page 4, Your Honor, the paragraph 
2 starting with the following information. 
3 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
4 MR. MISNER: Going to the end of that section are 
5 not relevant to Mr. Hooper's charges, his plea, or his 
6 sentencing. And just to explain I'm sure the Court's been 
7 through them. While this investigation is going on in this 
8 case, traffic is backed up because there are emergency 
9 vehicles on the road. 
10 THE COURT: Thanks to him. 
11 MR. MISNER: That's correct. A truck driver comes 
12 along and commits a crime. He does not stop at all, he's not 
13 trying to stop, rams into the back of the stopped traffic -
14 THE COURT: Yeah, and this is all because of your 
15 client. 
16 MR. MISNER: Well, it's because of the truck driver 
17 who's already been convicted in a trial. 
18 THE COURT: I suppose that's one way of looking at 
19 it. If your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic 
20 wouldn't have been stopped and I doubt if any other accident 
21 [inaudible]. 
22 MR. MISNER: Basically it -
23 THE COURT: I'm not going to strike anything on 
24 page 4. 
25
 MR. MISNER: Well, and everything else that I would 
1 ask the Court to strike I guess I just need to make a record 
2 of it. The next page, section D, investigator's comments, I 
3 would also ask the Court to strike it the exact same thing 
4 goes into that case and that sentence. 
5 THE COURT: What case? 
6 I MR. MISNER: The case with the truck driver who 
committed a crime. 
THE COURT: And you don't want that to be 
9 I considered? I thought you did want it to be considered. 
10 MR. MISNER: No, I think that was an intervening 
11 crime that was committed and has nothing to do with this 
12 case. 
13 THE COURT: I'll strike it on page 5. Anything 
14 else? 
15 MR. MISNER: I believe the last thing is page 9, 
16 Your Honor, and that's collateral contacts is something that 
17 totally is with regards to that as well, and I believe it's 
18 not appropriate in this report. 
19 THE COURT: I'm not changing that. 
20 MR. MISNER: And I guess while we're on that same 
21 issue just to make a record, my understanding is that there 
22 is going to be somebody here who wishes to speak. 
23 THE COURT: I'm sure there are a number of people. 
24 MR. MISNER: Well, one in particular that's here as 
25 a result of that crime that was committed. They're not a 
1 victim in this case, there are no charges relating to that in 
2 this case, and I would object to -
3 THE COURT: I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. 
4 I don't think that Dalrymple accident, for want of a better 
5 way to expressing it, would have occurred but for your 
6 client's conduct. 
7 MR. MISNER: I think the State would disagree 
8 because they didn't charge Mr. Hooper with anything as they 
9 couldn't because it was another separate crime. I guess my 
10 best way to make a record, Your Honor, is to me it would be 
11 the same as if an officer had pulled you over for speeding 
12 and was at your window writing you a ticket and somebody came 
13 by and ran the officer over as he was writing a ticket -
14 THE COURT: No, I don't -
15 MR. MISNER: - and the officer's wife coming and 
16 testifying against you. 
17 THE COURT: I don't see a that way. 
18 MR. MISNER: That's it with regards to that, Your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right, what else would you like to 
21 say? 
22 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, the only things that were 
23 left out of the report which were made available and aware to 
24 the person writing the report, Mr. Hooper is on medication, 
25 he has a seizure disorder. He's been to several doctors, 
1 there's a medical history of it. They've been unable to 
2 determine what causes these seizures, he blacks out, his 
3 family has seen him have these seizures and the black-out 
4 periods afterwards. He has - there was another time he was 
5 investigated for a DUI because he was in a single car 
6 accident and he had a seizure basically and blacked out and 
7 he had been in an accident. They suspected a DUI. He did 
8 the test -
9 THE COURT: When was that? Was that 11/10/87? 
10 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, I'm not exactly sure. 
11 THE COURT: I need to know. 
12 MR. MISNER: It was not a DUI though, that's the 
13 point, is they did a test and he had no alcohol in his 
14 system. 
15 THE COURT: All right, well what's compelling to me 
16 is that he does have five prior DUIs. 
17 MR. MISNER: He has - I have a 1978 DUI, Judge, a 
18 1982 DUI, and a 1996 DUI. 
19 THE COURT: There's one in %86 that was reduced to 
20 reckless; there was one in A87 although it says no 
21 disposition known; and then there's one in ^96. 
22 MR. MISNER: Yes, so we don't know about the y81 
23 one. It may very well be the one that was not a DUI. 
24 THE COURT: That's what I just asked. 
25 MR. MISNER: The 8^6 case is not a DUI, it's a 
1 reckless driving. 
2 THE COURT: It started as a DUI. 
3 MR. MISNER: The reason, I mean, what we're 
4 pointing out is that he does have a medical condition that 
5 has resulted in another accident. 
6 THE COURT: That results in DUIs? 
7 MR. MISNER: No, absolutely not. He in no way 
8 denies his history of having DUIs, Judge. 
9 THE COURT: Well, it certainly is coming across 
10 that way. What medical condition could contribute to these 
11 DUIs? 
12 MR. MISNER: None, none, Your Honor, none 
13 whatsoever. 
14 THE COURT: Then I don't know why it's relevant. 
15 MR. MISNER: It's only relevant to show what his 
16 current life situation is, which is one section in the 
17 report, it just doesn't include this information. And it's 
18 certainly not an excuse. He was under the influence at this 
19 time. He had a blood test. His blood alcohol level I 
20 believe was .15. 
21 THE COURT: That' right. 
22 MR. MISNER: We believe he did have a seizure as 
23 I well and it may have been caused by the alcohol and it's not 
an excuse and it's not a defense. He does not remember this, 24 
25 the things he told the police afterwards were untrue as to 
1 where he was coming from, Wendover and that sort of thing. 
2 That sort of information is indicative that he probably had 
3 another seizure. As I say, he's not excusing that, it's not 
4 a defense because he had drank too much and he was well over 
5 the legal limit. 
6 He has obviously his last crime, his last arrest, 
7 his last charge is a DUI in 1996. He's been sober for some 
8 period as he indicated in the report, until he broke off a 
9 relationship in 2005. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I'm not certain that's true. All 
11 we know is that he hasn't had a conviction since ^96. 
12 MR. MISNER: Of any kind. Your Honor, I have 
13 personally been in the position of the victims in this case. 
14 I know what they're going through. I know what this is. I 
15 wasn't -
16 THE COURT: Have you lost somebody to death in a 
17 traffic accident where someone was a drunk driver? 
18 MR. MISNER: Yes, I have. 
19 THE COURT: I see. 
20 MR. MISNER: I wasn't sure I could handle this 
21 case. I met Mr. Hooper, I went to see how this would go. I 
22 wanted Mr. Hooper to be a monster. It would have been 
23 easier. He's not. 
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 THE COURT: Well, that depends upon your definition 
25 of a monster. 
1 MR. MISNER: He's a sad old man who's an alcoholic. 
2 THE COURT: Who's killed people. 
3 MR. MISNER: He has and, in fact, when I first saw 
4 him in the hall today that's the first thing he did was start 
5 crying and said I have killed people and I've taken lives. 
6 There is no way he's a flight risk. There's no way he could 
7 go to trial. He could not deal with this issue. He has more 
8 remorse than any client I've every had. 
9 THE COURT: And so he should. 
10 MR. MISNER: Absolutely. He understands that, 
11 Judge, he does, he gets it. 
12 THE COURT: Well, he hasn't gotten it because he's 
13 been engaged in the same drunken driving process since 1978. 
14 MR. MISNER: And like many other people we get in 
15 here, Judge, it's the unfortunate thing of DUIs is that they 
16 don't get it until something like this happens and it's not a 
17 defense -
18 THE COURT: Well, and I think our society has been 
19 way too lenient in slapping people's hands when they have 
20 multiple DUIs. I'm not going to do that. 
21 MR. MISNER: And I certainly understand that, 
22 Judge, but he is not here asking you today to walk out of 
23 this courtroom. He understands what he's done. He's 
24 remorseful for it and he just wants the record to reflect 
25 exactly what is going on in his life and how he feels. He 
1 certainly, you know, understands what the Court is going to 
2 do today. He understands what's going on. I just want the 
3 Court to realize or to know that he is sorry, not like we 
4 usually say, he gets it. 
5 THE COURT: How can someone who kills people not be 
6 sorry? 
7 MR. MISNER: I've seen it. 
8 THE COURT: Well, okay, he's sorry. Is there 
9 anything else? 
10 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, just very briefly. It's 
11 not a defense, it's not an excuse, the difference between Mr. 
12 Hooper and another person who might be in here getting a 
13 sentence where this would be a normal DUI would be a second -
14 considered a second DUI for sentencing purposes. 
15 THE COURT: No, it wouldn't. 
16 MR. MISNER: In the two-year period this would be a 
17 class B DUI if nobody wasn't injured, Your Honor. The 
18 mandatory minimum would be 10 days, and we're not asking for 
19 that. The difference between somebody that gets 10 days and 
20 somebody that gets 1 to 15, and I won't say it's bad luck for 
21 Mr. Hooper, it's good luck for the person who happens to not 
22 get in an accident and kill somebody. Certainly no excuse, 
23 but just to make that distinction clear, if the driver of the 
24 other vehicle were alive, he would be standing before you 











































But he didn't kill anyone. 
He was a drunk driver as well. 
Yes, I understand that. He had a 
fact, he didn't kill anyone. 
MISNER: 
COURT: 
Well, I mean, somebody died. 
He didn't cause the accident. He 
going the wrong way on a freeway. So let's not 
the facts of 
MR. MISNER: 
this case. 
Well, I mean, and like I said it's 










It is no defense. 
no 
He certainly was partially responsible 
I cannot find that at all. 
He was traveling way in excess of the 
speed limit and did not avoid the head-on collision that a 
bus previously had. But it would be a DUI homicide. If 
you're driving drunk and somebody in your car dies -
THE COURT: You are trying to move the blame to 
someone else -
MR. MISNER: We're not. 
THE COURT: - but it's not selling well. 
MR. MISNER: We are not in any way, Judge, we're 































address the court, 
THE 
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Yes. Mr. Hooper? 
He does 
I wrote it all down. Can I j 
don't think I can -
COURT: 






I don't want it but you can re 
Can I read it? 
That's what I just said. 
DEFENDANT: I am so sorry that it took 
terrible tragedy to prove how rotten alcohol really 











and in this courtroom today that I will never touch this junk 
ever again. I'm so sorry. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Is that the same speech that you made 
before on your other priors? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. This is something I wrote 
lately. 
THE COURT: I assume you said basically the same 
thing -
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I probably did becuase I feel 
the same. 
THE COURT: But you -
THE DEFENDANT: I just thought I wouldn't be able 
to. 
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1 THE COURT: Would the State like to be heard, Ms. 
2 Cassell? 
3 MS. CASSELL: We would. Your Honor, prior to the 
4 [inaudible] I would ask in the courtroom present are Juan 
5 Martinez's family. I'm not sure that any of them even want 
6 to address the court. 
7 THE COURT: Would anyone of you like to speak 
8 briefly? The defendant is to move over to the jury box and 
9 we'll get the floor. 
10 MS. CASSELL: They have all spoken and I just don't 
11 think that they can talk today. However, also present, Your 
12 Honor, is Carl Studs who is the father of one of the women or 
13 people who was killed in the accident involving the truck. 
14 He would like to speak and he's also spoken with the family 
15 and -
16 THE COURT: Anyone who wishes to speak [inaudible]. 
17 MR. MISNER: Your Honor, just again for the record 
18 this involves that subsequent accident. We object, there's 
19 no standing. 
20 THE COURT: Well, once again I will say very 
21 clearly that none of this would have occurred but for your 
22 client's conduct. 
23 Yes, sir, I'd like to hear from you. 
24 MR. ?: I thank you for the opportunity. I live on 
25 a very short block or we did, there are eight houses on that 
13 
1 block. Two houses up from me, the father of our friend and 
2 neighbor was killed in that wreck. My house, my daughter was 
3 killed. Three houses down my daughter-in-law, which is my 
4 daughter was killed. Juan made mention when he came here one 
5 time, well, all of you together to be friends. We've been 
6 friends for years. I have no desire for Mr. Hooper to suffer 
7 physically or harm to him physically, but my understanding of 
8 incarceration is that people are put there because they're a 
9 danger to society or they cannot be - or they need 
10 rehabilitation. I don't believe that Mr. Hooper can be 
11 rehabilitated. It is my sincere belief that if he continued 
12 or was set free and let go today that again he would drive 
13 and drink. 
14 I don't know how many people may have told him you 
15 can't do that, you're going to hurt yourself, you're going to 
16 hurt somebody else. I believe he's a danger to society. I 
17 would ask the Court to extend the consecutive for him to be 
18 put away as long as possible to keep him off the roads. 
19 I again have, as I have met with the Martinezes 
20 they are left without a father. I realize Mr. Hooper has 
21 children that are concerned and care about him. I had a 
22 daughter, I no longer have her. 
23 J THE COURT: I'm so sorry, sir. 
MR. ?: She was a wonderful young lady, 29 years 24 
25 J old, she left a three year old and a three month old. She 
14 
1 was the sole support for that family. She was the assistant 
2 manager for Alpine City Planner and quite a young lady. I do 
3 not wish to have him harmed physically, but he cannot be on 
4 the streets. He cannot be driving. He needs to be placed 
5 where he has not - does not have that temptation of alcohol 
6 and automobiles together, and again I thank you for this 
7 opportunity. 
8 THE COURT: I thank you for speaking out. So sorry 
9 for your loss. 
10 MR. ?: I think of the Martinez family. They no 
11 longer have their father to direct them, to guide them, his 
12 physical and emotion support. Mrs. Martinez is a widow who 
13 no longer has her husband. 
14 And some comments were made about Mr. Hooper's -
15 not Mr. Hooper, Mr. Dalrymple. Mr. Dalrymple's a decent man. 
16 He has a conscience and his life has been destroyed. Was he 
17 guilty? Yes. He should have been [inaudible]. He wasn't. 
18 But he wasn't drinking, wasn't on drugs, and he wasn't 
19 speeding. It was a horrible accident. But anyway thank you, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
22 Would anyone else like to speak, and I urge you to 
23 take the opportunity now if you'd like to. I'd like to hear 
24 from you. 
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 MS. CASSELL: I don't think anyone else would like 
15 
1 to speak, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Cassell, I'm interested 
3 in your response. 
4 MS. CASSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I became 
5 involve in this case, Your Honor, immediately upon right 
6 after it happened. It happened, I think on Father's Day and 
7 I screened it from the beginning. I have never met a more 
8 decent group of people than the victims of these cases. They 
9 are, to a person not vindictive, not hateful, and they have 
10 lost more than any of us can ever imagine. They've lost 
11 their fathers, their daughters, their children, their best 
12 friends, and not any of them are vindictive and I've been 
13 humbled by their - by them. 
14 Mr. Dalrymple (sic) should go to prison, period, 
15 Your Honor. We want him to go to prison. He should to go 
16 prison is for - we agreed with - and Mr. Misner will probably 
17 mention this, we agreed that we would ask that these run 
18 concurrently, but we would ask that he be sentenced to the 1 
19 to 15. That's what he should go to prison in order for the 
20 protection of the community. No one, not the [inaudible], 
21 not the Martinezes, not countless other people. This didn't 
22 just affect these two families, it affected the families of 
23 everyone killed, of everyone - there's a 16 year old girl, I 
24 don't even know if this was mentioned, there was a 16 year 
25 old girl who was injured in the trucking accident who was 
16 
1 paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck down. 
2 There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers 
3 to those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are 
4 affected by Mr. Hooper's crime. 
5 Regardless of whether they can say that it was a 
6 direct result or if it was an incident that happened on 1-80 
7 that was just a malay, talking with Highway Patrol Troopers 
8 who were choking back tears at our trial when Mr. Dalrymple 
9 was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his 
10 life. And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether 
11 or not we can charge this as a crime, I believe it is 
12 immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was his 
13 responsibility. 
14 Witnesses who came upon this who didn't - weren't 
15 even part of the accident, their lives will be affected 
16 forever. 
17 Your Honor, we would ask that Mr. Hooper go to 
18 prison for the protection of all so that this never happens 
19 again, at least with respect to him and maybe it sends a 
20 message to all those people who would drink and drive that 
21 sometimes this happens you'll go to prison and you'll go to 
22 prison for a long time because nobody deserves to have this 
23 affect their lives like it did and on that, Your Honor, we 
24 submit it. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
17 
1 Mr. Misner, you're entitled to the last word. 
2 MR. MISNER: Thank you, Judge. Your Honor, I 
3 forgot there was one correction that I think we all need to 
4 point out. Count 2 is DUI causing serious bodily injury. I 
5 think that needs to be clear on the pre-sentence report that 
6 this is not a third degree DUI as they have indicated. 
7 THE COURT: I made that change. 
8 MR. MISNER: Thank you. 
9 Your Honor, I'd love to make myself feel better by 
10 brow beating Adult Probation and Parole but that's not going 
11 to help. 
12 THE COURT: Why would you brow beat them. I think 
13 you've kind of got the wrong target here. 
14 MR. MISNER: No, Judge, I mean - we all know what's 
15 going to happen here. 
16 THE COURT: It's AP&P's fault? 
17 MR. MISNER: No, absolutely not. We all know 
18 what's going to happen here today. We're not asking that Mr. 
19 Hooper not go to prison. We understand he is. I know Your 
20 Honor is not going to send for a diagnostic. The only reason 
21 I would like a diagnostic is so the prison would know what to 
22 do with him when he's there. But this case is clear what the 
23 sentence is going to be. What's the only issue for a pre-
24 sentence report in this case is should these be run 
25 concurrent or be consecutive. That's the only issue, and 
it's not even addressed. 
THE COURT: I think it's addressed. 
MR. MISNER: They don't put it any where in there. 
THE COURT: Well, they may not address it, but in 
my mind it's been addressed by the facts. We're not talking 
about one life, we're talking about three to five lives. 
MR. MISNER: I'm not going to beat that anymore, 
Judge, I think we're talking about two. We would certainly 
ask -
THE COURT: As if two lives was not significant? 
MR. MISNER: No, it is. That's why Mr. Hooper is 
going to prison. 
THE COURT: He'd be going to prison if it were a 
third degree felony and he hadn't killed anyone. I am tired 
of repeat DUIs. I'm tired of them. We have treated this 
serious crime as if it is nothing. And what we get is 
someone like this who wipes out all these vehicles, all these 
human lives and who impacts so many people, and I don't know 
what would have changed if he'd been held accountable on 
others the way he should have been held accountable, but I 
know what's going to happen today. 
With reference to the automobile homicide, a second 
degree felony, he's sentenced to the maximum. He's sentenced 
to the indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at the Utah State 
Prison. 
19 
1 In connection with the driving under the influence 
2 of alcohol or drugs causing bodily injury, a third degree 
3 felony, he's sentenced to the term of zero to five years, and 
4 that is to run consecutive to the 1 to 15. He'll be doing 
5 both sentences at the prison and it is my intention to write 
6 a letter to the Board of Pardons anytime he comes up for 
7 parole and indicate to the Board of Pardons that I don't 
8 think he ought to be released one day early. This is the 
9 most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have seen in a long 
10 time. And what this tells me is that some people are just 
11 not capable of learning. It's as if he were carrying a 
12 loaded gun around and pointing it at people all the time and 
13 he's not going to change. This goes all the way back to 1978 
14 I believe we decided, and this man - excuse me, 1962 is when 
15 his record began. There was a hit and run in A62, that could 
16 have been alcohol related, and the first DUI was in ^78. 
17 This is an appalling record, an appalling scenario. These 
18 people who have lost family members will never be the same. 
19 So the sentence is not appropriate, it ought to be a greater 
20 sentence, but it's the maximum I can impose. 
21 He is to pay restitution in full to all the victims 
22 involved. The State has 30 days or 45 days to gather the 
23 information on that and the defense has 45 days to consider 
24 it and file any objection they may have and ask for a hearing 
25 if they deem it appropriate. He's to pay a fine in the 
20 
amount of $5,000 plus an 85 percent surcharge, and he's to 
pay a recoupment fee in the amount of $500 as part of his 
punishment. 
Mr. Hooper, I don't even have the words to describe 
what I think of you and your conduct. So perhaps I'll 
[inaudible]. You deserve to go to prison right now and stay 
for the rest of your natural life. 
Put him in cuffs. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state 
if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that 
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503. Penalties for driving under the influence violations 
(1) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 is 
guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor; or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
(iii) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle 
at the time of the offense. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 is guilty of a third degree felony if: 
(a) the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(b) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is within ten years of two or more prior convictions 
as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2); or 
(cont.) 
(c) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is at any time after a conviction of: 
(i) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; 
(ii) a felony violation of Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that 
would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or 
(iii) any conviction described in Subsection (2)(c)(i) or (ii) which judgment of conviction is 
reduced under Section 76-3-402. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations-
Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to 
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection 
(6)(b). 
(cont.) 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed 
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207. Automobile homicide 
(1) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes 
any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person 
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation. 
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is 
subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2). 
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(3)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another 
and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person 
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as 
defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the 
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section. 
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made 
in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(l). 
(cont.) 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally 
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense. 
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is 
admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance-
Probation— Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality-
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension-
Hearings— Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime 
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence 
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of 
class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is 
with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is 
vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall 
be provided. 
(cont.) 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise 
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to 
conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. 
However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in 
accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of 
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department 
or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on 
the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment 
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and 
the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, 
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies 
(cont.) 
cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the 
record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the 
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED 
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has 
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed 
on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection 
(8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(cont.) 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 
during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-
27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any 
extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer 
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay 
should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation 
of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(cont.) 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall 
determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, 
modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall 
present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based 
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court 
for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division 
of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State 
Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(cont.) 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment 
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are 
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access 
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63- 2-403 and 63-2-404, the State 
Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. 
Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department 
may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department 
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report 
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall 
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the 
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the 
crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76- 3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in 
accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(cont.) 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and 
install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either 
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Daily Weekly! | Monthly | | Custom | | Trip Planner 






Heating Degree Days 
Month to date heating degree days 
Since 1 July heating degree 
Cooling Degree Days 
Month to date cooling degre 
Year to date cooling degree 








Month to date precipitation 
Year to date precipitation 
Snow 
Snow 
Month to date snowfall 
Since 1 July snowfall 
Snow Depth 
Sea Level Pressure 
Sea Level Pressure 
Wind 
Wind Speed 




















0.00 in / 0.00 cm 
1.64 
12.78 




29.68 in/1005 hPa 
10mph/15km/h(NNW) 
23 mph / 37 km/h 
Average 
70°F /21 °C 








0.02 in / 0.05 cm 
0.53 
9.25 
0.00 in / 0.00 cm 
T 
62.7 




0.32 in/0.81 cm (1975) 
-0 













6 / 1 
Max Gust Speed 
Visibility 
Events 
T = Trace of Precipitation, MM 
25mph/40km/h 
10 miles /16 kilometers 
= Missing Value Source: NWS Daily Summary 
90 p 
Temperature Dew Point Normal High/bow 
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i indDir fdeg)M 
hW 
J4- JL L I j. i 
midnightl 8 9 10 11 noon 1 4 5 8 9 10 11 
Hourly Observations 
(MDT) T e m P e r a t u r e D e w P o i n t Humidity pJ^gJJJJ1 Visibility Erection Wind Speed GustS 
12:56 55.0 °F / 42-1 °F / 
AM 12.8 °C 
1:56 5 1 . 1 ° F / 
AM 10.6 °C 
2:56 50.0 ° F / 
AM 10.0 °C 
3:56 50.0 °F / 
AM 10.0 °C 
5.6 °C 62% 
42.1 °F / 
5.6 °C 71% 
42.1 ° F / 
5.6 °C 
41.0 ° F / 
5.0 °C 
74% 
4:56 48.0 ° F / 39.9 °F / 
71% 
74% 
29.64 in / 10.0 miles / 
1003.7 hPa 16.1 kilometers 
29.66 i n / 
1004.2 hPa 
29.66 in / 
1004.4 hPa 
29.67 in / 
1004.6 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers 






8.1 mph / 
13.0 km/h / 
3.6 m/s 
9.2 mph / 
14.8 km/h / 
4.1 m/s 
5.8 mph / 
9.3 km/h / 
2.6 m/s 
4.6 mph / 
7.4 km/h / 
2.1 m/s 
4.6 mph / 
7.4 km/h / 
AM 8.9 °C 4 .4 °C 1004 .6 hPa 16 .1 kilometers 2.1 m/s 
5:56 51 .1 ° F / 4 2 . 1 ° F / 
AM 10.6 °C 5.6 °C 7 1 % 
29 .66 in / 10.0 miles / 
1 0 0 4 . 4 hPa 16 .1 kilometers South 
3.5 mph / 
5.6 km/h / 
1.5 m/s 
6:56 51 .1 ° F / 4 4 . 1 ° F / 
AM 10.6 °C 6.7 °C 77% 
29 .69 In / 10 .0 miles / 
1 0 0 5 . 4 hPa 16 .1 kilometers SW 
4.6 mph / 
7.4 km/h / 
2.1 m/s 
7:56 55 .9 ° F / 
AM 13 .3 °C 
8:56 57 .9 ° F / 
AM 14 .4 °C 
9:56 62 .1 °F / 
AM 16.7 °C 
10:56 64 .0 ° F / 
AM 17 .8 °C 
4 4 . 1 ° F / 
6.7 °C 64% 
29.70 in / 
1005.7 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers NNE 
5.8 mph / 
9.3 km/h / 
2.6 m/s 
4 3 . 0 ° F / 
6.1 °C 58% 
2 9 . 7 1 in / 
1 0 0 5 . 9 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers North 
3.5 mph / 
5.6 km/h / 
1.5 m/s 
4 3 . 0 ° F / 
6.1 °C 50% 
2 9 . 7 2 in / 
1 0 0 6 . 2 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers NW 
45.0 ° F / 
7.2 °C 50% 
2 9 . 7 1 in / 
1 0 0 6 . 0 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16 .1 kilometers NNW 
8.1 mph / 
13.0 km/h / 
3.6 m/s 
10.4 mph / 
16.7 km/h / 
4.6 m/s 
11:56 68 .0 ° F / 
AM 20 .0 °C 
12:56 70 .0 °F / 
PM 2 1 . 1 °C 
1:56 72.0 ° F / 
PM 22.2 °C 
2:56 72.0 °F / 
PM 22.2 °C 
4 6 . 9 ° F / 
8 .3 °C 47% 
2 9 . 7 3 in / 
1 0 0 6 . 5 hPa 
10.0 mi les / 
16.1 kilometers NNW 
15.0 mph / 
24.1 km/h / 
6.7 m/s 
45.0 ° F / 
7.2 °C 4 1 % 
2 9 . 7 3 in / 
1 0 0 6 . 7 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16 .1 kilometers NNW 
15.0 mph / 
24.1 km/h / 
6.7 m/s 
4 4 . 1 ° F / 
6.7 °C 37% 
2 9 . 7 4 in / 
1006 .9 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16 .1 kilometers NNW 
16.1 mph / 
25.9 km/h / 
7.2 m/s 
4 3 . 0 ° F / 
6.1 °C 35% 
29 .75 in / 
1 0 0 7 . 5 hPa 
10.0 mi les / 
16.1 kilometers NW 
19.6 mph / 





3:56 73.0 °F / 
PM 22.8 °C 
4 2 . 1 ° F / 
5.6 °C 33% 
29.75 in / 
1007.4 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers NNW 
17.3 mph / 
27.8 km/h / 
7.7 m/s 
4:56 73.9 °F / 
PM 23.3 °C 
39 .9 ° F / 
4 .4 °C 29% 
29 .75 i n / 10.0 mi les / 
1007 .5 hPa 16 .1 kilometers North 
11.5 m p h / 
18.5 km/h / 
5.1 m/s 
5:56 73 .9 ° F / 
PM 23 .3 °C 
6:56 73.9 ° F / 
PM 23.3 °C 
4 1 . 0 ° F / 
5.0 °C 30% 
29.73 in / 
1006.8 hPa 
10.0 mi les / 
16 .1 kilometers NNW 
9.2 mph / 
14.8 km/h / 
4.1 m/s 
39 .9 ° F / 
4.4 °C 29% 
2 9 . 7 3 in / 
1006 .5 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers NNW 
7:56 72.0 °F / 
PM 22.2 °C 
4 1 . 0 ° F / 
5.0 °C 33% 
29 .73 in / 
1006 .6 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers NW 
8.1 mph / 
13.0 km/h / 
3.6 m/s 
8.1 mph / 
13.0 km/h / 
3.6 m/s 
8:56 69 .1 °F / 
PM 20 .6 °C 
9:56 66 .9 °F / 
PM 19 .4 °C 
4 3 . 0 ° F / 
6.1 °C 




29 .73 in / 
1006 .7 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers 
29 .75 i n / 
1007 .3 hPa 




9.2 mph / 
14.8 km/h / 
4.1 m/s 
6.9 mph / 
11 .1 km/h / 
3.1 m/s 
10:56 64.9 ° F / 
PM 18.3 °C 
11:56 62.1 °F/ 
PM 16.7 °C 
43.0 °F/ 
6.1 °C 45% 
46.0 ° F / 
7.8 °C 56% 
29.76 In / 
1007.6 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers South 
29.76 in / 
1007.8 hPa 
10.0 miles / 
16.1 kilometers SE 
4.6 mph / 
7.4 km/h / 
2.1 m/s 
8.1 mph / 
13.0 km/h / 
3.6 m/s 
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TabF 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. ROBIE JOSEPH DALRYMPLE 
CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-206 - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: December 06, 2005 Not Guilty 
Disposition: March 30, 2006 Guilty 
Charge 2 - 76-5-206 - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: December 06, 2005 Not Guilty 
Disposition: March 30, 2006 Guilty 
Charge 3 - 76-5-206 - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: December 06, 2005 Not Guilty 
Disposition: March 30, 2006 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - ROBIE JOSEPH DALRYMPLE 
Represented by: J KEVIN MURPHY 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: ROBIE JOSEPH DALRYMPLE 
Date of Birth: November 03, 1964 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: UHP - Salt Lake City 
LEA Case Number: 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 05018138 
Sheriff Office Number: 
Violation Date: June 18, 2005 7200 WEST 1-80 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 71.25 
Amount Paid: 71.25 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 1.25 
Amount Paid: 1.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
CASE NOTE 
DAO 05018138 defendant not booked on summons as per JEMS. 
PROCEEDINGS 
10-04-05 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned. 
10-04-05 Case filed 
10-04-05 Filed: Information 
10-04-05 Note: CASE FILED BY SGT LGWEHRLI OF UHP SUMMONS ISSUED 
10-04-05 ARRAIGNMENT - SUMMONS scheduled on December 06, 2005 at 09:00 
AM in Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
10-04-05 Issued: Summons 
Printed: 03/07/07 14:01:58 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
Judge ARRAIGNMENT ARRAIGNMENT 
Hearing Date: December 05, 2005 Time: 09:00 
10-13-05 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE ON SUMMONS. LEFT WITH ATTORNEY 
KEVIN MURPHY. 
Party Served: DALRYMPLE, ROBIE JOSEPH 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: October 11, 2005 
11-01-05 Filed: Appearance of Counsel, Entry of Not Guilty Plea, Jury 
Demand, and Motion for Discovery filed by J Kevin Murphy, 
Attorney for Defendant 
11-01-05 Filed: Response to Request for Discovery filed by Patricia S 
Cassell, Deputy DA 
12-06-05 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 21, 2006 at 02:00 PM 
in Fourth Floor - S4 5 with Judge ATHERTON. 
12-06-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sunshinb 
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Video 
Tape Number: Disk 73 Tape Count: 9:20:27 
ARRAIGNMENT 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
Counsel stipulate to waive the appearance of the Defendant today, 
he lives in Alabama. Defense counsel waives any speedy trial 
issues. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 02/21/2006 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
12-06-05 Judge ATHERTON assigned. 
12-06-05 Note: Defendant to be present at Pre-Trial Conference. Issue of 
defendant reporting to ADC for book and release on summons to 
be resolved at Pre-Trial Conference 
12-09-05 Note: Bail remain Summons (not yet booked). 
02-21-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Printed: 03/07/07 14:02:01 Page 3 
CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
Clerk: sunshinb 
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Video 
Tape Count: 2:37 
HEARING 
COUNT: 2:37 
Defendant is requesting a Bench Trial. Defendant is to go to the 
jail and be booked and released to Pretrial Services with the 
understanding that the release will be the defendant just checking 
in since he does not live in this State. Case continued. 
1 DAY BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/30/2006 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
02-21-06 1 DAY BENCH TRIAL scheduled on March 30, 2006 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - S4 5 with Judge ATHERTON. 
03-10-06 Filed: Stipulated Exhibit List 
03-24-06 Filed: Stipulated Exhibit List for Trial 3-30-06 Defendant's 
Motion with supporting memorandum and Trial Memorandum. 
03-29-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum 
03-30-06 Received: March 30, 2006 
Container: 2-VERY LARGE ENVELOPES 2-CHARTS Location: 2-VLE 
2-CHARTS 
03-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sunshinb 
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:26 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
TRIAL 
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
COUNT: 9:26 
Defendant waives reading of the information. Opening statements 
by the defense. Opening statements by the State. Exclusionary 
rule invoked. 9:33 Jason Hunter is sworn and testifies. State's 
exhibits #1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7 is offered and received. 
Cross-examination. Re-direct. Re-cross. 10:32 William Paul 
Dunford is sworn and testifies. Cross-examination. 10:51 Greg 
Rowberry is sworn and testifies. Cross-examination. 11:15 Jerry 
Workman is sworn and testifies. Cross-examination. Re-direct. 
Re-cross. 11:27 Richard Beveridge is sworn and testifies. 
Cross-examination. Defendant's exhibit #1 is offered and admitted. 
Re-direct. Re-cross. State Rests. Defendant's motion to dismiss 
is denied. Defendant waives his right to testify. 
Defense does not wish to call any witnesses. Closing statements 
by the State. Closing statements from the defense. The Court 
finds the defendant guilty on all counts as stated on the record. 
Ms. Cassell to prepare a findings of facts. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 06/09/2006 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
03-30-06 SENTENCING scheduled on June 09, 2006 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 5 with Judge ATHERTON. 
03-30-06 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
03-30-06 Charge 2 Disposition is Guilty 
03-30-06 Charge 3 Disposition is Guilty 
03-30-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
03-30-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
Note: 20.00 cash tendered. 5.00 change given. 
03-30-06 Filed: Exhibit List 
04-14-06 Filed: Stipulated Motion and Order for Pre-Sentence Interview 
by Telephone (DENIED) 
04-20-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
04-20-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
04-26-06 Filed: Def's proposedm findings of fact 
05-11-06 Filed: Stipulation to Continue Sentencing Date 
05-17-06 Filed order: Findings of Fact 
Judge jatherto 
Signed May 17, 2006 
05-25-06 SENTENCING rescheduled on August 08, 2006 at 09:00 AM 
Reason: Stipulation of counsel. 
05-30-06 Filed: Letter to the Court from William Prince (SEALED) 
07-01-06 Judge BARRETT assigned. 
07-06-06 Filed: Transcript of Bench Trial dated 3-30-06, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
07-10-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 
07-10-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 
07-21-06 Filed: Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment and 
alternative Motion for Conviction of Lower Degree of Offense 
with Supporting Memorandum 
07-21-06 Filed: Notice of Submission of Trial Transcript 
08-03-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Arrest 
of Judgement 
08-04-06 Filed: AP&P Presentence Report 
08-07-06 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for 
Arrest of Judgement and Alternative Motion for Conviction of 
Lower Degree of Offense 
08-08-06 Judge ATHERTON assigned. 
08-08-06 Tracking started for Probation (Other). Review date Aug 08, 
2009. 
08-08-06 Tracking started for Community Service. Review date Aug 08, 
2009. 
08-08-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sunshinb 
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:15:21 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9:15:21 
Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgement and Alternative Motion 
for Conviction of Lower Degree of Offense is Denied. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
to run consecutive to each other 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor 
Complete 500 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service is to be completed by August 8, 2009. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 

















15-06 Fee Account created 
15-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY 
15-06 Fee Account created 
15-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY 
15-06 Fee Account created 




1 5 . 0 0 
1 5 . 0 0 







07-06 Filed: Defendant's Notice of Appeal 
11-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Defendant's Notice of Appeal forwarded to 
Utah Court of Appeals 
13-06 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Letter to J. Kevin Murphy - the 
notice of appeal in this case has been filed with the Utah 
Court of Appeals - 20060827-CA 
18-06 Filed: Defendant/Appellant's Certificate that No Transcript is 
Required (Trial Transcript Previously Filed in Trial Court) 
19-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Defendant/Appellant's Certificate that No 
Transcript is Required (Trial Transcript Previously Filed in 
Trial Court) - forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals - 20060827-CA 
10-06 Note: INDEXED 
10-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Record Index forwarded to Utah Court of 
Appeals - 20060827-CA 
10-06 Note: Record forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals - Files-2, 
Tran-1, Exh-1 envelope - paginated - 20060827-CA 
12-06 Filed: Utah Court Of Appeals - Order of Dismissal - 20060827-CA 
12-07 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Remittitur Received - Record 
Received - Files-2, Tran-1, Exh-1 envelope - paginated - Appeal 
Dismissed - 20060827-CA 
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